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Introduction
Nigeria built its immediate post-independence development on the 
Welfarist approach, and the government is saddled with the task of providing 
or subsidizing basic social infrastructure such as health, education, road, 
electricity and communication along with other public utilities. Ravaged by 
corruption and inept fiscal maladministration, Nigeria’s once-buoyant 
economy, started faltering especially after the oil glut of the 1980s and 
eventually led to economic depression (Omobowale 2009; Montinola and 
Jackman 2002).
Economic depression hence clearly revealed the precarious state of 
Nigeria’s public corporations that had been surviving only on government 
subvention while political office holders and executives fleeced these 
corporations. These corporations were centres of predatory corruption where 
officials dishonestly extracted huge funds to line private pockets which left 
the corporations inefficient (Sowunmi, Adesola, and Salako 2010; Szeftel 
2000; Agbese 1988). The Nigerian experience is indeed similar to other 
occurrences across Africa. According to Olivier de Sardan (1999), what goes 
on in Africa is a generally accepted culture of corruption, which pervades 
every spectrum of African society, such that “To stand out or distinguish 
oneself in public (by rejecting the ‘privileges of one’s status,’ for example) 
generates shame” (p. 46). Hence, corruption is “…socially embedded in 
‘logics’ of negotiation, gift-giving, solidarity, predatory authority, and 
redistributive accumulation” (p. 25). In order to put an end to deliberate acts 
of corruption bedeviling the public service sector in most Third World 
nations, there is an international campaign for the enthronement on the New 
Public Management Order1 (see Haque 2001; Denhardt and Denhardt 2000). 
Following the World Bank promptings, Nigeria adopted a public restructuring 
through privatization supposedly directed at tackling corruption and 
enhancing efficiency. 
It is pertinent to note, however, that reforms in the public service sector 
are not novel in Nigeria. It was pioneered by Generals Mohammed/Obasanjo 
1 The New Public Management Order involves the adoption of neo-liberal/private sector 
approaches in public service management such that citizens are seen as customers who must be 
served efficiently in economic terms (see also SERVICOM 2007; Brune, Garrett, and Kogut 2004; 
Trebing and Voll 2006; Hefetz and Warner 2004; Nicholson-Crotty 2004; Armijo and Faucher 2002; 
Savas 2001; Morgan and England 1988; Haruna 2001; Christensen and Laegreid 1999; Terry 1993, 
1998).
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regime(s)2 in the late 1970s. Then, the government claimed it was done 
tackling corruption, inefficiency, and other social ills in the civil service by 
making the public service sector compact and accountable to the people. By 
the end of the exercise, about 10,000 public officials had lost their jobs 
(Adamolekun and Ayo 1989; Otobo 1986). The return of Chief3 Obasanjo as 
a civilian head of state in 1999 signaled another round of reforms in the 
public sector. Particularly, in the telecommunications sector, the government 
moved to break NITEL’s monopoly by licensing private fixed and mobile 
networks and putting NITEL up for sale.  Indeed, as shown in the figure 
below, this has resulted in the growth of the telecommunications sector.
Figure 1 above shows progressive increase in telephone density in 
Nigeria since 2001 when private GSM came into operation. Thus, access 
increased from 553,374 in 2000 to 1,223,258 by 2005 for fixed telephone 
subscribers and 35,000 to 18,587,000 for mobile phone users, resulting in a 
total telephone density of 19,810,258 by 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics 
2 General Obasanjo became the head of state after Colonel Dimka led an abortive coup that 
claimed the life of General Murtala Mohammed on February 12, 1976.
3 Nigeria’s political class members who came out of the military socio-political structure 
apparently prefer civilian titles, perhaps in order to sustain acceptance in a social structure of highly 
anti-military rule that pervaded Nigeria in the late 1990s.
































Fig. 1. Growth of Nigerian telecommunication industry.
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2006). In spite of this monumental increase, it is important to note that the 
influence of NITEL as a major player in the telecommunications sector rather 
gradually began its abysmal decline. As customers opted for other networks 
considered more efficient, its lines began to dwindle. In government circles, 
this more than ever before justified the need to privatize NITEL. It was 
indeed a new phase in the “life” of a seemingly once buoyant4 public 
parastatal. This study examines NITEL’s privatization process, consequent 
restructuring, and the impact this had on the organisation’s staff. Data for this 
study were collected through interviews and secondary sources.
The Story of NITEL
NITEL was the result of a merger between Nigeria External 
Telecommunications (NET) and the telecommunications arm of the Post and 
Telecommunications (P&T) department of the Ministry of Communications 
in 1985 by the proclamation of the General Buhari government that merged 
(Aroge 2000). As a state monopoly, it gradually grew and stretched its 
presence to at least all of the state capital and other major towns. The 
company experienced financial turn-around in 1992 when it was 
commercialized by the federal government. Thenceforth, it stopped receiving 
subvention from the government and, therefore, had to survive on its own by 
expanding its customer base and by generating higher income.  
Nevertheless, as much as its profit profile and customer base increased, it 
was largely similar to the National Electric Power Authority (NEPA), a sister 
government monopoly in charge of electric power generation, which was also 
bedeviled by endemic corruption and inability to supply adequate power 
(Olukoju 2004). Indeed, NITEL was such that could be described as huge but 
hollow telecommunication company which survived as long as it did not 
have competition. Its customers were rather treated as servants who could 
not complain against the decisions of the master. NITEL officials apparently 
saw the organization’s deplorable service as social service to the few relatively 
rich Nigerians who can afford this luxury while the poor majority should not 
even think of it. This was a period in which application for a telephone line 
4 NITEL was only seemingly buoyant once. Its weakness was clouded in the excesses of its officials 
whom customers had to plead with to have lines secured, installed, or repaired. Since there was no 
competitor, customers could hardly complain, as such may attract refusal to connect or repair lines 
by the officials for whom customers who desired to have and maintain telephone lines, not just as a 
necessity but as a status symbol, were somewhat in awe.
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would take months-if not years-to be approved by the officials in charge 
while those with connections in the corridors of power could have their 
applications approved quickly, and even if the lines were approved and put in 
place, the connections were bedeviled with constant failure while many lines 
summarily go dead when raining. A NITEL customer desirous of having his/
her line back on track had to wait at a NITEL office, sometimes providing 
transportation for a NITEL official, carrying ladders, and following a NITEL 
technician to other repair sites until it reached his/her turn. By the time the 
customer had his/her line fixed, s/he might have spent up to eight to ten 
hours at the mercy of a NITEL technician whom s/he would have to tip at the 
end in order to secure the technician’s “favour” when next such is needed. In 
spite of all these, however, NITEL remained a profit-making organization 
due, of course, to the monopoly it enjoyed. 
The story changed in 2001 with the granting of operational licenses to 
independent GSM companies, namely MTN and ECONET, and much later 
GLOBACOM. In real terms, this was a welcome development for many 
Nigerians and an opportunity to escape from the strangle-hold of monopoly 
that had taken the citizenry for granted. Hence, the gain of the new 
telecommunication companies became the loss of NITEL, as it found it 
difficult to compete with the other firms.
For the government, this may have further justified the resolve to move 
from mere commercialization to privatization. The first attempt at 
privatization in 2002 failed as the preferred buyer, Investment International 
Limited (ILL) of Britain, failed to pay the sum of $1.317 billion it had offered 
for NITEL within the stipulated period (Nigerian Newsday 2007). Thereafter, 
the Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) opted for a management consultant 
to run NITEL to modernize and increase its lines in preparation for 
privatization. The criterion prescribed was that:
…[I]nterested managers MUST be international telecommunications 
operators and MUST demonstrate, one, evidence of having installed and 
managed at least a million telephones; two, a successful track record of 
expanding a telecommunications network in a developing country; three, 
sufficient management resources to grow NITEL and enhance shareholder 
value. (Nigerian Village Square 2006, p. 1)
Of course, the guiding perquisite for NITEL management was to ensure it 
would only get into to the hands of experienced managers who could 
positively turn it around. However, it ended up in the hands of Pentascope, a 
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company set up just about a year earlier with eight staff members, whose 
address was traced to a dilapidated church building in Amsterdam, 
Netherlands, at $4 million per annum, to be paid by the federal government 
(Daily Independent 2007; Nigerian Village Square 2006). 
Within one year, the failure of Pentascope became just too glaring! 
When Pentascope took over NITEL, it had 455,000 lines and about N17.7 
billion in its coffers. By the time Pentascope was sacked, NITEL lines had 
dwindled to 288,000 and it had also lost about N100 billion with a backlog of 
unpaid wages (Daily Independent 2007; Nigerian Newsday 2006). 
NITEL remained in this moribund state until another solution was 
found for it through its sale to Transcorp, a supposed Nigerian multinational 
corporation, which Daily Independent described as “…an indigenous 
company without pedigree.” Transcorp is indeed an organization in which 
President Obasanjo5 and some other economic and political elite have 
substantial interests. The sale to Transcorp was rushed without giving other 
firms equal chance of bidding on NITEL. This transaction again reflected 
predatory tendencies meant to satisfy the whims and caprices of a few 
members of the privileged political and economic class. With Transcorp 
came staff rationalization, which claimed over 7,000 jobs out of the former 
workforce of about 10,000. 
The Bureau of Public Enterprises, which was saddled with the task of 
privatizing NITEL, opted for a buy-out scheme that left the disengaged staff 
and pensioners with little to gain, unlike the gratuity/pension scheme 
enshrined in the NITEL Staff Conditions of Service (see table 1 below).  
The table above specifies the retirement benefits NITEL staff would 
enjoy. A close scrutiny shows that it was designed to reward loyalty and long 
service to the company. Thus, NITEL staff would be morally constrained and 
motivated to put in their best and avoid anything that may jeopardize the 
benefits they are to enjoy. This was indeed a better welfare package than the 
buy-out which the government opted for. Although the disengaged workers 
asked for a 10-year salary as severance pay, BPE opted for a graduated 
scheme on the basis of years put in service as presented below:
1-10 years: two-year buy-out
11-15 years: two-and-a-half-year buy-out
16-20 years: 3-year buy-out
21-25 years: three-and-a-half - year buy-out
5 President Obasanjo handed Transcorp over to President Yaradua on May 27, 2007.
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26-35 years: four-year buy-out
As for those who had retired prior to the privatization programme, they were 
simply bought out via the three-year pension. Indeed, improving the 
situation of NITEL through reforms may be a welcome development which 
definitely requires proper implementation (this shall be addressed later on in 
the paper). For now, it is important to consider the plight of the disengaged 
workers and pensioners in view of the manner they were bought out. 
Table 1. Computation and Payment of Pensions and Gratuity in Pre-Privatized 
NITEL
Years of Qualifying Service Gratuity as Percentage of Final Pay
















































































Source: Staff Conditions of Service (Nigerian Telecommunications PLC 1992, p. 46).
* No data are available for years of qualifying service 10 to 14.
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Pre-Privatization Conditions of Service and Post-Privatization 
Experience
NITEL employees generally described pre-privatization conditions of 
service at NITEL in glowing terms. Interviewees recounted with nostalgia 
NITEL’s conditions of service as one of the best in Nigeria prior to 
privatization. For example, an employee (a senior manager) who was retained 
after privatization stated:
NITEL conditions of service were alright. It was like the third highest-
paying public organization in Nigeria. Staff were trained and retrained. We 
could hardly notice negative challenges. People were promoted when due. 
Promotion came after every two years, provided there were vacancies. (Oral 
Interview/Retained/April 24, 2007)
Likewise, another respondent further corroborated the claim above with a 
stint of distinction from what happened from the pre-merger days:
The condition of service at NET was very attractive and rewarding. 
Employees were awarded car loans as at when due while capacity training 
was extended to members of staff periodically, even in institutions abroad. 
We were not happy when we were asked to merge with P&T. This was 
because our condition of service at NET was quite better. Those at P&T 
were bedeviled with the ills in the civil service because they were part of the 
Communications Ministry. They were not as trained as we were, their 
emoluments were meager while promotion did not come for them as at 
when due, unlike the case in NET. With the merger, P&T entrants were 
given a step ahead of those in NET because the government believed they 
had been denied promotion for so long. And so the “step ahead” was to 
compensate them and bring them on par relative to their colleagues at NET. 
After the merger, we could no longer enjoy the things we used to enjoy 
under NET. The salary became meager; you had to queue for a loan, while 
training abroad became a thing of the past. However, I stayed because of the 
security of tenure service. Provided one complied with the rules, one would 
retire after 35 years of service and enjoy one’s gratuity and pension 
thereafter. (Oral Interview/Post-Privatization Disengaged/April 18, 2007)
Still another interviewee who started his career from P&T states:
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I was happy joining P&T in 1974, because it was a bit different from the 
ministry in terms of pay and good conditions of service and job prospects. I 
joined as a draughtsman, and then in-between I received a promotion and 
came to the University of Ibadan under study-leave-without-pay. I studied 
sociology between 1977 and 1980 and became a postal controller thereafter 
at P&T. I later transferred to the personnel department… The job prospect 
was good. Every year we were positively transforming from one stage to 
another…everybody was happy because there was gradual improvement 
until we reached the peak when everybody in NITEL was being paid very 
good salary. (Oral Interview/Pre-Privatization Retiree 1/April 23, 2007)
What could be deduced from the data above is that the respondents were 
convinced of the successful/benefiting service period for as long as they 
remained at NITEL and thereafter. Even the respondent who had misgivings 
at the merger of NET with P&T to form NITEL stayed on due to security of 
tenure and other benefits at NITEL. Aside from good remuneration, NITEL 
also trained its staff both locally and internationally. These were aimed at 
building and ensuring experienced and skilled staff that would be capable of 
sustaining the growth and dominance of the company in the 
telecommunications sector. As long as NITEL’s monopoly lasted, it seemed 
NITEL was achieving its aim. Nevertheless, NITEL was only achieving its 
aim of running a profitable state monopoly; it was not delivering efficient 
service to its customers. This was confirmed by an interviewee as thus: 
When NITEL carried the day, NITEL workers acted like gods. People were 
begging NITEL staff to get their lines fixed… And so by the time GSM 
came, people abandoned NITEL out of annoyance…in spite of the high cost 
of GSM. The situation was that bad. (Oral Interview/Pre-Privatization 
Retiree 1/April 23, 2007)
This is one of the ills of monopoly as pointed out by Morgan and England 
(1988). If NITEL was not optimally efficient as it should be, it was not 
because its employees were not well paid or untrained, nor was it because of 
the dearth of equipments. It was due to negligence and unwarranted acts of 
customer disloyalty. NITEL customers were at the mercy of its staff. Indeed, 
in such a situation, the client was not a valued customer, but rather just 
another hapless individual who may be exploited for his/her quest for a 
functional line. Of course, under a monopoly, customers had to endure 
NITEL’s inefficiency without NITEL realizing its faults. Once GSM came into 
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operation, NITEL’s inefficiency became overwhelmingly pronounced and 
NITEL could not compete with other telecommunications companies in spite 
of its advanced human, technological, and capital resources. In fact, new 
GSM companies attracted NITEL staff that had technical expertise, and these 
companies also depended initially on some vital NITEL equipment for their 
operation. As a public corporation, NITEL did not enjoy the full 
commitment and loyalty of its employees. An interviewee gave insight into 
why NITEL employees were not fully committed:
If you talk of organization that has training facilities, you cannot get anyone 
better than NITEL in Nigeria. NITEL has two gigantic training institutions 
in Lagos and Kano. The one in Lagos is for training engineers while the one 
in Kano is for management training. Also there was house sourcing system 
where you can pursue a degree or higher qualifications to any level. Under 
that, I was permitted to obtain a master’s degree, which was funded by 
NITEL, and a Ph.D., which was self-sponsored. Likewise, many people were 
sent for training. But the skills they acquired were not put into use. This is 
because one would have been told that “…your study leave has been 
approved, but in spite of whatever certificate you bring, you have to wait in 
queue until it is your turn to receive a promotion.” The fact that they 
sponsored my master’s programme did not change the queuing system. I 
could not get a promotion over and above someone who was less trained. 
The emphasis was rather on the quota system, federal character, etc.…the 
training received did not translate to efficiency within the organization 
because the best hands available were not allowed to do the job. (Oral 
Interview/Pre-Privatization Retiree 1/April 23, 2007)
Training is considered essential for organizational success and survival, but at 
NITEL, socio-political consideration was allowed to overshadow the essence 
of training. Nigeria has a quota system, which is enshrined in the country’s 
federal character policy. The quota system was put in place in Nigeria’s 
constitution to ensure that the different ethnic groups are represented in 
public office and to also ensure that all ethnic groups have access to state 
resources. Strict adherence to the ethos of the quota system at NITEL 
resulted in disregarding the values of merit, ability, and efficiency in the 
organization’s reward system in favour of ethnic spread/balance. This must 
have somewhat resulted in disenchantment among staff members who have 
received training but were denied promotion, leading, therefore, to 
institutional inefficiency and widespread corruption despite the huge training 
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structure put in place. 
Likewise, interviewees cited several cases of institutional misappropriation 
of funds and corruption perpetrated by the government. An interviewee puts 
what happened during the military era as thus:
…[T]he moment the military knew there was money, everybody started 
looking into NITEL. NITEL funds were channeled to finance the military 
and its officers through undocumented financial benefits paid to officers. 
Likewise, NITEL funds were used to pay the salary of public officials in 
other establishments such as the police. (Oral Interview/Pre-Privatization 
Retiree 1/April 23, 2007)
Another interviewee states:
It was the government and the management that have over the years 
destroyed NITEL. When NITEL was buoyant, the military government of 
those days diverted NITEL funds to pay allowances to military officers from 
NITEL purse. These officers just took and spent money recklessly. There 
was no accountability. Besides, the level of corruption among the 
management staff was enormous. In fact, there was a case of an average-
income-earning university lecturer who was appointed Managing Director 
at NITEL. He built a personal multi-million naira estate within a short time 
while in office. These people embezzled NITEL funds to enrich themselves 
and gave archaic equipments in return. (Oral Interview/Pre-Privatization 
Retiree 2/April 30, 2007)
By and large, what the interviewees have highlighted is the siphoning of 
NITEL’s funds to the management of other government agencies, 
misappropriation of funds, and corruption especially during Nigeria’s long 
years under military rule. One should rightly wonder why the military and 
other government agencies are financed from NITEL’s funds. Inasmuch as it 
might have gone against civil service rules, refusal to comply with the 
directive of the military government, however illegal and/or irrational, by any 
government official would lead to his/her removal from office and possibly 
detention and prosecution over trumped up charges. Therefore, in order to 
tow the line drawn by the military government and remain in office, NITEL 
management had to transfer funds as demanded, to the detriment of the 
company, even as top management staff unduly profited through 
embezzlement as well. NITEL’s supposed success under a monopoly quickly 
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collapsed after market reforms. In spite of its state-of-the-art equipments and 
highly trained staff, NITEL could not compete with private telephone 
companies once the stage was set for competition. 
Those who had to pay the price of NITEL’s failure, however, were not 
government officials or the management that mismanaged its funds. Neither 
did the government take the blame for sticking to an ethnic balancing 
principle which resulted in stifled efficiency. Rather, the negative sanction 
came on the employees and retirees who were laid off and bought out by BPE 
in preparation for a takeover by Transcorp, the new buyer. This translates to 
immense hardship for the disengaged workers. An interviewee presents his 
case below:
I feel shortchanged. The “security of tenure,” which attracted and retained 
me at NITEL, has been bastardized. Now I have little for all I contributed 
into NITEL. If I had worked for the full 35 years, I would have been able to 
make adequate preparations for post-retirement life. But now, I am being 
forced to learn to become an entrepreneur. If only my pension would keep 
on coming, I would be collecting more than N100, 000 (US$833) per 
month. With the loss of our pension, how do they want us to survive? (Oral 
Interview/Post-Privatization Disengaged/April 18, 2007)
Yet another interviewee states:
…[T]he way the pension was paid was too bad. Workers who have worked 
for up to 33 years and more were paid maximum of 4 years of pension 
payment… These are people who could hardly work at another place. Those 
who had retired before privatization were paid only 3 years of pension 
payment. How are they to survive? Are they expected to steal?… How do we 
define that? So, they are simply saying, go and die. This was not supposed to 
be the case of NITEL. I think some government officials actually wanted 
NITEL to die so that it could be sold at a give-away price. The property 
NITEL has is enough to take care of its pensioners if well managed. Our 
recommendation was that core telecommunication areas be privatized while 
the properties are left with NITEL pension fund so that retirees and 
disengaged workers may be taken care of. If that was done, there would be 
no problem as the real estate property in the form of landed properties, 
estates, buildings, etc. runs to billions of Naira. (Oral Interview/Pre-
Privatization Retiree 1/April 23, 2007)
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A different interviewee states:
Gratuity and pension are so meager that one can do little with it. In fact, by 
the time the government decided to buy out retirees, only 3 years of pension 
payment was made. We were shortchanged. The proposal before 
government was for 10 years. The government approved 5 years while BPE 
paid only 3 years. The case is in court now. Retirement benefits should last 
for life as contained in the condition of service we entered into and not be 
cut short by the government. (Oral Interview/Pre-Privatization Retiree 2/
April 30, 2007)
The data presented above reveal feelings of gloom among former NITEL staff 
who feel cheated by an organization they had served under the promise of 
continued sustenance after meritorious retirement. Their plight was even 
further compounded by the liquidation and sale of the properties of the 
hitherto viable NITEL pension fund, which could have assured continued 
pension payment even after privatization. As much as making NITEL 
efficient and viable to compete favourably with others may be desirable, even 
if it means privatizing, the question that deserves an answer is the rationale 
behind “abandoning” the workers who had sustained it via their human 
resources. Is it because they were deemed corrupt as well? Of course, this may 
be an indication of the complexity of corruption, which Olivier de Sardan has 
earlier identified as the bane of Africa.
Just as management contract with Pentascope ended in massive failure 
due to the half-hearted implementation of reforms that could have revamped 
NITEL, the seemingly questionable sale of NITEL to Transcorp,6 which was 
described as an organization without pedigree, gives every hint of a process 
still not devoid of corruption. And so, whereas the privatization was 
supposed to ensure efficiency and timely delivery of service, the unethical 
process of NITEL’s sale therefore rather ensured a process in which 
disengaged staff and retirees who were seen as burdensome to the new 
managers were simply dispensed with through the buy-out. One wonders 
what this buy-out really means. Is this sale a buying out of employment or 
survival/life? So far, the NITEL staff and retirees were already disengaged 
and, hence, not a buying out employment or compensation for 
6 At present the government of President Yaradua has re-acquired NITEL from Transcorp due 
again to mismanagement, corruption and failure to revamp the company. The Management Team of 
Transcorp is also on trial for the embezzlement of N15 billion from NITEL coffers. 
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disengagement. Rather, it is buying out the responsibility to continue to take 
care of NITEL workers whose activities had also contributed to the 
deplorable state of NITEL. 
Conclusion
NITEL is another glaring example of inefficiency, government failure, 
and massive corruption practiced in the Nigerian state. Attempts at 
revamping NITEL have been foiled by predatory privatization where public 
office holders have once again influenced the process of selling it to favoured 
companies in which they have vested interest. And thus, little emphasis is put 
on the welfare of the workers or retirees who have been bought out and, in 
fact, abandoned. 
While NITEL was buoyant, it was an epicenter of corruption perpetrated 
by both its employees and government officials. And at wit’s end, it has been 
taken over by representatives of the political and economic elites who have, of 
course, abandoned NITEL’s retirees and laid off about 70 per cent of its 
workforce. At present, the Nigerian government under President Yaradua has 
re-acquired NITEL from Transcorp, again due to mismanagement, 
corruption, and failure to revamp the company, and the management team of 
Transcorp is also on trial for embezzling N15 billion from NITEL coffers, 
while NITEL remains comatose. This paper, therefore, argues that the case of 
NITEL is representative of predatory corruption in the Nigerian system. 
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